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h  i g  h  l  i  g  h  t  s
• We  use  a normative  (Bayes  optimal)  model  of oculomotor  pursuit.
• We  average  the empirical  responses  of  subjects  performing  a pursuit  paradigm.
• We  invert  these  responses  using  the  pursuit  model  and dynamic  causal  modelling.
• We  thereby  estimate  the  precision  of subjects’  Bayesian  beliefs  from  their  pursuit.
• This  could  be  used  to quantify  abnormal  precision  encoding  in  schizophrenia.
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Background:  This  paper  introduces  a new  paradigm  that  allows  one  to quantify  the  Bayesian  beliefs
evidenced  by  subjects  during  oculomotor  pursuit.  Subjects’  eye  tracking  responses  to  a partially  occluded
sinusoidal target  were  recorded  non-invasively  and  averaged.  These  response  averages  were  then  ana-
lysed  using  dynamic  causal  modelling  (DCM).  In DCM,  observed  responses  are  modelled  using biologically
plausible  generative  or forward  models  –  usually  biophysical  models  of neuronal  activity.
New  method:  Our key innovation  is  to use a generative  model  based  on  a normative  (Bayes-optimal)
model  of active  inference  to  model  oculomotor  pursuit  in terms  of  subjects’  beliefs  about  how  visual
targets  move  and  how  their  oculomotor  system  responds.  Our  aim  here  is  to  establish  the  face  validity
of  the  approach,  by  manipulating  the  content  and precision  of sensory  information  –  and examining  the
ensuing  changes  in  the  subjects’  implicit  beliefs.  These  beliefs  are  inferred  from  their  eye movements
using  the  normative  model.
Results:  We  show  that on  average,  subjects  respond  to  an  increase  in  the  ‘noise’  of target  motion  by
increasing  sensory  precision  in their  models  of the  target  trajectory.  In other  words,  they  attend  more  to
the sensory  attributes  of a noisier  stimulus.  Conversely,  subjects  only  change  kinetic  parameters  in their
model  but  not  precision,  in  response  to increased  target  speed.
Conclusions:  Using  this  technique  one  can estimate  the  precisions  of  subjects’  hierarchical  Bayesian  beliefs
about target  motion.  We  hope  to  apply  this  paradigm  to  subjects  with  schizophrenia,  whose  pursuit
abnormalities  may  result  from  the  abnormal  encoding  of precision.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
This paper considers the modelling of oculomotor pursuit using
active inference – a normative or Bayes-optimal formulation of
action and perception which has been used to address a range of
issues in the cognitive neurosciences (Friston et al., 2010a). In a
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 020 7679 9033.
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previous paper, we  formulated oculomotor control during smooth
pursuit eye movements (SPEM) in terms of active inference, with
a special focus on how representations of uncertainty or preci-
sion could affect eye tracking behaviour (Adams et al., 2012). We
established that impairment in the encoding of precision (inverse
variance of random ﬂuctuations) at higher levels of a hierarchical
model of oculomotor control (e.g., frontal eye ﬁelds or prefrontal
cortex) resulted in several SPEM abnormalities characteristic of
schizophrenia; e.g., a greater slowing of pursuit during target occlu-
sion. In this work, we  use a similar generative model to predict
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jneumeth.2015.01.003
0165-0270/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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empirical eye movements, and thereby make inferences about how
subjects optimise their oculomotor responses to moving targets.
In particular, we were interested in whether we could induce
changes in the precision subjects ascribe to sensory information (by
changing the precision of target motion) and infer these subjective
changes from measured eye movements.
The model of pursuit used below is based upon active infer-
ence. Active inference is a corollary of the free energy principle –
a normative model of behaviour that appeals to Bayes optimality
principles. In brief, the principle says that we sample sensory inputs
to minimise prediction errors. Clearly, prediction errors depend
upon predictions and inference about hidden states of the world
causing sensory data. A crucial aspect of this inference is the proper
weighting of sensory evidence and prior beliefs. Operationally, this
rests upon weighting prediction errors in accord with their pre-
cision (reliability or inverse variability). This is formally identical
to weighted least squares in statistics. Anecdotally, one can regard
prediction errors as reporting what is newsworthy (what cannot
be predicted) and precision turns up the ‘volume’ of processing
channels with more reliable news.
In this paper, we present the methodology that enables one to
quantify subjective precision on the basis of empirical eye move-
ments – as a prelude to comparing normal and schizophrenic
cohorts (see Section 3). If changes in subjective precision due to
alterations in stimulus attributes can be estimated from pursuit
data, then perhaps abnormalities of cortical precision found in psy-
chiatric illness can be disclosed.
This paper comprises the following sections. Section 2.1 pro-
vides a brief introduction to active inference and predictive
coding. Active inference provides a normative model of oculo-
motor behaviour, given a generative model that subjects used to
predict their behaviour, described in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 pro-
vides a brief overview of dynamic causal modelling – a standard
variational Bayesian scheme for inverting dynamic or state space
models. Section 2.4 describes the experimental paradigm used
to elicit oculomotor pursuit under visual occlusion and Section
3 presents the dynamic causal modelling results using the active
inference model. Section 4 concludes with some comments about
the potential applications of this non-invasive approach to quan-
tifying subjective beliefs or expectations entertained by subjects –
and how the scheme can be extended to cover neurophysiological
responses.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Active inference, generalised ﬁltering and free energy
This section introduces active inference in terms of generalised
Bayesian ﬁltering – also known as predictive coding. In brief, active
inference can be regarded as equipping standard Bayesian update
schemes with classical reﬂex arcs that enable action to fulﬁl pre-
dictions about (hidden) states of the world. We  will describe the
formalism of active inference in terms of differential equations
describing the dynamics of the world – and internal states of
the visual–oculomotor system. This scheme is used in subsequent
sections to predict pursuit movements under different levels of
conﬁdence (precision) about hierarchical predictions.
Active inference is based on three assumptions that formalise
the notion that the brain generates predictions of its sensory sam-
ples to conﬁrm hypotheses about the state of the world – and how
the world is sampled:
• The brain minimises the free energy of sensory inputs deﬁned by
a generative model.
Fig. 1. Exchange with the environment. This schematic illustrates the dependencies
among various quantities modelling exchanges of an agent with the environment.
It  shows the states of the environment and the system in terms of a probabilistic
dependency graph, where connections denote directed dependencies. The quanti-
ties  are described within the nodes of this graph – with exemplar forms for their
dependencies on other variables (see main text). Hidden and internal states of the
agent are separated by action and sensory states. Both action and internal states –
encoding posterior or conditional expectations about hidden states – minimise free
energy. Note that hidden states in the real world and the form of their dynamics can
be different from that assumed by the generative model; this is why hidden states
are in bold and internal states are in italics. See main text for further details.
• The generative model used by the brain is hierarchical, nonlinear
and dynamic.
• Neuronal ﬁring rates encode the expected state of the world,
under this model.
The ﬁrst assumption is the free energy principle, which leads to
active inference in the embodied context of action. The free energy
here is a proxy for Bayesian model evidence. In Bayesian terms,
minimising free energy means that the brain maximises the evi-
dence for its model of sensory inputs (Gregory, 1980; Ballard et al.,
1983; Dayan et al., 1995; Olshausen and Field, 1996; Grossberg
et al., 1997; Bialek et al., 2001; Knill and Pouget, 2004), in accord
with the Bayesian brain hypothesis (Yuille and Kersten, 2006;
Maloney and Zhang, 2010). If we  also allow action to maximise
model evidence we  get active inference (Friston et al., 2010a). In this
setting, desired movements are speciﬁed in terms of prior beliefs
about hidden states in the generative model. Action then realises
prior beliefs by sampling sensory inputs to provide evidence for
those expectations. The second assumption above is motivated by
noting that the world is both dynamic and nonlinear and that hier-
archical structure emerges inevitably from a separation of temporal
scales (Ginzburg, 1955; Haken, 1983). The ﬁnal assumption is the
Laplace assumption that, in terms of neural codes, leads to the
Laplace code, which is arguably the simplest and most ﬂexible of
all candidate codes (Friston, 2009).
Under these assumptions, action and perception can be
regarded as the solutions to coupled differential equations describ-
ing the dynamics of the real world, action and perception (Friston
et al., 2010a):
s = g(x, v, a) + ωs
x˙ = f(x, v, a) + ωx
(1)
a˙ = −∂aF(s˜, ˜)
˙˜ = D  ˜ − ∂˜F(s˜, ˜)
(2)
See Fig. 1 for a schematic summary of the conditional dependen-
cies implied by Eqs. (1) and (2). For clarity, real-world states are
written in boldface, while the states of the agent are in italics. The
∼ notation denotes variables in generalised coordinates of motion
where s˜ = (s, s′, s′′, . . .)  (Friston et al., 2010b). The pairs of equa-
tions are coupled because sensory states s(t) depend upon action
a(t) through non-linear functions (g, f) of hidden states and causes
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(x, v), while action depends upon sensory states through inter-
nal states ˜(t). Internal states play the role of expectations about
hidden states that minimise free energy –
F = Eq[ln q(x˜, v˜| ˜) − ln p(s˜, x˜, v˜|m)] (3)
– or maximise (a lower bound on) Bayesian model evidence
ln p(s˜|m)≥ − F . Here, q(x˜, v˜| ˜) is an approximate posterior density
over hidden variables (x˜, v˜) that is parameterised by their expected
values. Note that the free energy depends upon a generative model:
p(s˜, x˜, v˜|m) = p(s˜|x˜, v˜)p(x˜, v˜|m) (4)
This model, denoted by m,  is usually speciﬁed in terms of a like-
lihood and prior (see below). Hidden causes can be thought of as
inputs or perturbations to hidden states that produce sensations.
In this paper, the hidden cause is a force on a target and the hid-
den states are the ensuing motion of the target (and eye). Eq. (1)
describes the dynamics of hidden states and causes in the world
and how these generate sensory data. These equations are stochas-
tic because sensory states and the motion of hidden states are
subject to random ﬂuctuations ωs, ωx. The second pair of differen-
tial equations (Eq. (2)) corresponds to action and perception – they
constitute a gradient descent on variational free energy. The differ-
ential operator D  returns the generalised motion of the conditional
expectations – such that D  ˜ = (′, ′′, ′′′, . . .).
To perform simulations using this scheme, one simply integrates
or solves Eqs. (1) and (2) to simulate (neuronal) dynamics that
encode expectations and ensuing action. The vector D  ˜ is han-
dled numerically by truncating the order of generalised motion to
a small number (usually between two and six). One can do this
because the precision of high order motion disappears quickly,
even for relatively smooth ﬂuctuations. The variational free energy
depends upon a generative model, which we assume has the hier-
archical form shown in Eq. (5), in which the hierarchical level is
denoted by (i):
s = g(1)(x(1), v(1)) + ω(1)v
x˙(1) = f (1)(x(1), v(1)) + ω(1)x
...
v(i−1) = g(i)(x(i), v(i)) + ω(i)v
x˙(i) = f (i)(x(i), v(i)) + ω(i)x
...
(5)
This equation denotes a generative model m that speciﬁes a prob-
ability density function over sensory inputs and hidden states and
causes (Eq. (4)). This probability density is needed to deﬁne the free
energy (Eq. (3)) and rests on Gaussian assumptions about random
ﬂuctuations (ω(i)x , ω
(i)
v ) on the motion of hidden states and causes.
These ﬂuctuations play the role of sensory noise at the ﬁrst level
and induce uncertainty about states at higher levels. The (inverse)
amplitudes of these ﬂuctuations are quantiﬁed by their precisions
(˘(i)x , ˘
(i)
v ).
The deterministic part of the model is speciﬁed by nonlin-
ear functions (g(i), f (i)) of hidden states and causes that generate
dynamics and sensory consequences. Hidden causes link hierarchi-
cal levels, whereas hidden states link dynamics over time. Hidden
states and causes are abstract quantities that the brain uses to
explain or predict sensations – like the motion of an object in the
ﬁeld of view. In hierarchical models of this sort, the output of one
level acts as an input to the next; at the bottom of the model is not
v(0) but s, the sensations it is trying to predict. This input can pro-
duce complicated convolutions with deep (hierarchical) structure,
as we will see examples of this later.
In terms of the biological implementation of active inference,
expectations can be updated using predictive coding (Rao and
Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2005), which minimises free energy in the
form of prediction errors. In other implementations of the active
inference framework, action is produced by proprioceptive predic-
tions that descend to the level of (pontine) cranial nerve nuclei
and the spinal-cord. These engage classical reﬂex arcs to suppress
proprioceptive prediction errors and elicit the predicted motor tra-
jectory. The reduction of action to classical reﬂexes follows because
the only way that action can minimise free energy is to change sen-
sory (proprioceptive) prediction error. In short, active inference can
be regarded as equipping a generalised predictive coding scheme
with classical reﬂex arcs: see Adams et al. (2013a), Friston et al.
(2010a) for details.
Active inference in the oculomotor system may eschew an
explicit computation of proprioceptive prediction errors in cra-
nial nerve nuclei – because the oculomotor system does not have
to contend with context-sensitive loads on the eye (and has to
produce rapid movements). Indeed, proprioceptive deafferentation
does not affect oculomotor function in monkeys (Lewis et al., 2001).
This suggests proprioceptive predictions must be transformed into
motor commands by a simple inverse model, rather than being
realised by a classical reﬂex. This inverse model is simple because
proprioceptive predictions and motor commands are in the same
(motor) frame of reference. Interestingly, the inclusion of ocu-
lomotor delays in the current model mandates a simple inverse
modelling of delayed kinematics (Perrinet et al., 2014). Having said
this, the (peripheral) mechanism by which descending propriocep-
tive predictions produce oculomotor commands is not important
for our purposes: we are interested in the effects – and estimation
– of precision in the (central) model.
In summary, we  have derived the dynamics of perception and
action using a free energy formulation of Bayes-optimal exchanges
with the world and a generative model that can be implemented a
biologically plausible fashion. A technical treatment of the material
above is found in Friston et al. (2010), which provides the details
of the generalised ﬁltering used in subsequent sections. To use this
scheme in any particular setting, one has to specify the particular
generative model in Eq. (5). We  now turn to the oculomotor pursuit
model used in this work.
2.2. Oculomotor pursuit model
The oculomotor pursuit model used here is based on the gener-
ative model of SPEM described in Adams et al. (2012) but with one
fundamental change. Our previous model was of smooth pursuit
only – while it could generate catch-up movements of saccade-like
speed, it could not generate anticipatory movements. In this appli-
cation, we wanted to model grand averaged empirical eye traces,
and so we had to choose between removing saccades to create aver-
age eye velocity traces and averaging eye displacements in toto.
The second option was  preferred, because removing the saccadic
portion of the trace would dismiss the synergy between saccades
and SPEM during target occlusion (Orban de Xivry et al., 2006),
and suppress the anticipatory nature of the eye movements we
observed.
This oculomotor pursuit model is essentially a model designed
to generate ‘grand averaged’ pursuit movements (which include
both SPEM and saccades): it does not reproduce the enormous vari-
ability of single trial data. It is neither a model of smooth pursuit
per se, nor of separate (pursuit and saccadic) systems: it is not
designed to explain how pursuit and saccades might operate in
isolation, unlike many models of oculomotor control. The purpose
of this model is to derive estimates of subjective precision at differ-
ent levels in a hierarchical model of pursuit: these precisions are key
parameters, which – if the brain performs Bayesian inference–must
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exist ‘in the head’. In future work, we will correlate estimates of
subjective precision (from grand averaged pursuit data) with neu-
ronal estimates of synaptic gain (from grand averaged MEG  data)
that are thought to encode precision. If successful, this will serve as
a validation of inverting models of average pursuit trajectories to
provide a non-invasive assay of synaptic gain (i.e., subjective pre-
cision) in different subject cohorts. The remaining parameters (and
model structure) are not intended to be biologically realistic, except
in the general sense of realising a hierarchical Bayesian model of a
smoothly moving target.
Eye movements are modelled as if they were driven reﬂexively
by descending predictions based upon the following beliefs: the
subject believes there is an invisible location – moving sinusoidally
along a horizontal line–that is attracting a target. Crucially, the sub-
ject also believes that the centre of gaze is attracted to this invisible
location, the target or both. This means that the eye movements
do not always try to track the target itself, but sometimes a point
which is always just ahead of the target. The latter is useful when a
target is moving quickly; for example, as when ice hockey coaches
advise young players not to try to hit the puck itself, but ‘where the
puck is going’. Furthermore, attraction to the invisible location and
target may  or may  not depend upon whether they lie behind an
occluder. This enables the model to make anticipatory eye move-
ments; for example, if the target is occluded the eye can track the
invisible attracting location instead. The relative attraction of the
invisible location and target – and the inﬂuence of the occlude –
depends upon the (kinetic) parameters of each subject’s genera-
tive model (see below). This model allows for many contingencies
and entails a relatively large number of parameters. However, we
will see later that redundant parameters (or model components)
can be eliminated using Bayesian model optimisation.
We now consider the model in more detail (also see Fig. 2). The
‘real world’ generating sensory inputs is shown on the left of Fig. 2.
We go through the equations in turn:
s =
[
so
st
]
=
[
xo
g(v, xo)
]
+ s (6)
Eq. (6) says that the world provides sensory input in two modali-
ties. First, the output of an oculomotor inverse model reports the
(horizontal) angular displacement of the eye s0 and corresponds to
the centre of gaze in extrinsic coordinates x0. Second, visual input
reports the angular position of a target in a retinal (intrinsic) frame
of reference st. This input models the response of visual channels,
each equipped with a Gaussian receptive ﬁeld with a width of one
angular unit and deployed at intervals of one angular unit (about 2◦
of visual angle). These receptive ﬁelds are centred on the locations
in the vector r = [−8, . . .,  0, . . .,  8], where 0 is the centre of gaze.
Crucially, this visual input can be occluded by a function of target
location O(v) ∈ [0,  1]:
g(v, xo) = O(v) · exp(−(r + xo − v)2) (7)
v = cos(2t)  (8)
This means that whenever the sinusoidally-varying target location
(hidden cause) v is behind the occluder, visual input falls to zero.
The response of each visual channel depends upon the distance
of the target from the centre of gaze. This is just the difference
between the oculomotor angle and target location in an extrinsic
frame of reference: xo–v.
x˙ =
[
x˙o
x˙′o
]
=
[
x′o
a − x′o
]
+ x (9)
Eq. (9) describes the hidden states of this model which comprise
oculomotor angle and velocity (xo, x′o), where velocity is driven by
action and decays to zero, with a time constant of one time step
(about 16 ms). This means the action applies forces to the oculo-
motor plant, which responds with a degree of viscosity.
The generative model is shown on the right of Fig. 2 and detailed
below. It has a similar form – at the sensory level the models are
identical (compare Eqs. (10) and (6), and (11) and (7)), although the
subject’s estimation of target position xt has replaced its real world
value v:
s =
[
so
st
]
=
[
xo
g(xt, xo)
]
+ ωs (10)
g(xt, xo) = O(xt) · exp(−(r + xo − xt)2) (11)
Note that the sensory input is exactly the same as the sensations
generated by the real-world process (Eq. (6)). However, there are
two important differences between the generative process and the
generative model of the process: there is no action and both the
target and centre of gaze are drawn to a (ﬁctive) attracting location
whose position is encoded by a hidden cause v:
v = exp(7) · cos(2t + exp(8)) + ωv (12)
Eq. (12) shows the attracting location v is a sinusoidal function of
time with parameters controlling its amplitude and phase (7, 8).
Further parameters control the evolution of hidden states (note
that the expected motion x′o is distinct from the motion of the
expectation x˙o: heuristically, this is like the difference between
motion-sensitive responses in V5 and the motion of peak responses
in V1):
x˙ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x˙o
x˙′o
x˙t
x˙′t
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x′o
v(v − xo) + t(xt − xo) − 2x′o
x′t
1
4 (v − xt) − 6x′t
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+ ωx (13)
The hidden location v attracts the target – i.e. changes in tar-
get velocity x˙′t are driven by the distance between the target and
invisible location (v − xt) – but with a viscosity encoded by 6.
The viscosity of eye movements is encoded by 2. Changes in
eye velocity x˙′o are determined by a weighted combination of the
distances between the eye and the invisible location and target
v(v − xo) + t(xt − xo). The relative strength of these two forces
depends on whether the target or invisible locations are occluded:
v = 1 − 4O(v ∨ xt) (14)
t = 3 + 5O(v ∨ xt) (15)
Each strength (v, t) has a ﬁxed component and an occluder-
dependent component (Eqs. (14) and (15)) that depends on the
remaining kinetic parameters (1, 3, 4, 5). Here, the occluder is
a function of the disjunction (inclusive ‘or’) of attractor and target
location – such that changes in  anticipate the emergence of xt
from the occluder).
The resulting set up is shown on the upper right of Fig. 2: the
generative model believes that the centre of gaze (blue circle) is
attracted to the hidden location or cause (pink circle) and the target
(red circle). The hidden location drives eye movement when the
target is either visible or occluded. The priors for the parameters
are chosen such that when the occluder is present, the strength
of attraction to the hidden location increases and the strength of
attraction to the target decreases, as one might expect. Finally, the
model parameters include the precision of random ﬂuctuations at
each level (Eqs. (10), (12) and (13)); namely, the sensory input (ωs),
the motion of the hidden states (ωx) and the hidden cause (ωv). The
ω terms are independent random effects.
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Fig. 2. Generative process and model of oculomotor pursuit movements. This schematic illustrates the process (left panel) and generative model of that process (right panel)
used  to simulate Bayes optimal pursuit. The graphics on the left show a putative predictive coding scheme (with superﬁcial pyramidal cells in red and deep pyramidal cells
in  black in the pontine nuclei) processing proprioceptive information during oculomotor pursuit. These cells receive proprioceptive information from an inverse model in
the  subcortical oculomotor system and respond reﬂexively to minimise proprioceptive prediction error through action. This prediction error rests on descending predictions
from  the generative model on the right. The actual movement of the target is determined by a hidden cause (target location), which determines the visual input for any given
direction of gaze. The generative model entails beliefs about how the target and eyes move. In brief, this model includes an invisible location that attracts the target, causing
it  to move. Crucially, the agent believes that its centre of gaze is attracted to this location (and the target), where the forces of attraction may (or may  not) depend upon
occlusion of the target and its attracting location. These forces of attraction are illustrated with lilac arrows in the top right; the arrows are labelled with their respective
multipliers from the equations directly below. Please see main text for a description of the variables in the equations describing the motion of hidden states and how they
depend  upon hidden causes. Note that real states that are hidden from observation in the real world are in bold, whereas the hidden states assumed by the generative model
are  in italics. (For interpretation of the references to color in the text, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Having speciﬁed the generative process and model, we can now
solve the active inference scheme in Eqs. (1) and (2) and use this
to predict observed behaviour. Fig. 3 shows the posterior or con-
ditional expectations about hidden states and causes during the
simulation of pursuit over one cycle of target motion. This simula-
tion assumes some particular values for the parameters that we  will
use as prior expectations later (see Table 1). In both the simulations
and later empirical studies the target was  occluded whenever it
passed behind an occluder at a leftward displacement of 0–0.8 of
maximal target displacement. In this simulation, the expected log
precision of the random ﬂuctuations of sensory input, motion of
hidden states and the hidden cause in the generative model were
all set to four. This corresponds to an expected standard devia-
tion of exp(−2) = 0.135 (of maximum target displacement). We
Table 1
Prior expectations of model parameters and log precisions.
Parameter class Model parameter Short description Prior expectation
Kinetic (1, 4) Parameters encoding how gaze is attracted to the invisible location – occluder independent and dependent. ( 14 ,
1
32 )
(3, 5) Parameters encoding how gaze is attracted to the target location – occluder independent and dependent ( 12 ,
1
32 )
(2, 6) Parameters encoding the viscosity of eye and target motion (ﬁxed between experimental conditions) ( 12 ,
1
4 )
Precision ln  ˘s Log precision of sensory noise 4
ln  ˘x Log precision of eye and target motion 4
ln  ˘v Log precision encoding the motion of the attracting location 4
Prior (7, 8) Parameters encoding the amplitude and phase lag behind the invisible attracting location (1, 232 )
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Fig. 3. Simulation of pursuit of a partially occluded target. This ﬁgure reports the posterior or conditional expectations about hidden states and causes during the simulation
of  oculomotor pursuit movements over one cycle of target motion. The position of the occluder is illustrated in all panels by the parallel grey lines – these do not always
coincide with changes in state estimates because the latter are calculated in 16 ms  time steps. The upper left panel shows the proprioceptive predictions (blue line) and
prediction errors (dotted red lines). The upper middle panel shows the predicted retinal input – the red, cyan and purple lines correspond to the middle three of an array
of  17 photoreceptors (the target is centrally ﬁxated) – and the dotted red lines are prediction errors. The sensory predictions are based upon the expectations of hidden
oculomotor (blue line) and target (red line) angular displacements shown on the lower left; the corresponding velocities are shown as the green (eye) and cyan (target) lines
on  the lower middle graph. The grey regions correspond to 90% Bayesian conﬁdence intervals. Note the increase in uncertainty about the location of the target during periods
of  occlusion. The hidden cause of these displacements (broken black line) is shown with its conditional expectation (blue line) in the lower right panel. The true cause and
action are shown on the upper right. The action (blue line) is responsible for oculomotor displacements and is driven by proprioceptive prediction errors.
suppressed the random ﬂuctuations in the generative process so
that the target motion was inﬁnitely precise. (In our subsequent
experiment, random ﬂuctuations in the generative process were
either suppressed or accentuated, and the estimated or subjective
precision was inferred from their eye movements.)
The upper left and middle panels of Fig. 3 show the predicted
sensory input (coloured lines) and sensory prediction errors (dot-
ted red lines). In the upper middle graph, the red, cyan and purple
lines correspond to photoreceptor activity over an array of 17 sen-
sory inputs: only the middle three inputs show activity because
the target is well-ﬁxated. In the upper left graph, the propriocep-
tive predictions (blue lines) reﬂect veridical pursuit; even during
occlusion when visual input disappears. These sensory predictions
are based upon the expectations of hidden oculomotor (blue line)
and target (red line) angular displacements shown on the lower
left. In the lower middle graph, the green (oculomotor) and cyan
(target) lines are the corresponding velocities. The grey regions cor-
respond to 90% Bayesian conﬁdence intervals. Note the increase
in uncertainty about the location of the target during periods of
occlusion. The hidden cause of these displacements (broken black
line) is shown with its conditional expectation (blue line) in the
lower right panel. The true cause and action are shown on the
upper right. The action (blue line) is responsible for oculomotor dis-
placements and is driven by proprioceptive prediction errors (red
lines in the upper left panel). This dependency of action on propri-
oceptive prediction errors effectively closes the action perception
loop.
The ensuing target trajectory and pursuit is shown in Fig. 4
(upper row). The upper left panel shows the trajectory of the target
(broken black line) and the centre of gaze (red line). The difference
between these angular displacements is the position error on the
upper right. The values of the parameters in Table 1 were chosen
to produce movements that caricature normal pursuit. Examples
of real trajectories and position errors are shown in the lower left
and right panels respectively (normalised with respect to time and
displacement). These are the averaged responses under different
experimental conditions that will be analysed later. Both the simu-
lated and empirical pursuit trajectories show a deviation from the
true target trajectory after it passes behind an occluder (the vertical
broken lines), which is corrected when the target re-emerges. This
correction generally produces an overshoot.
These simulations reproduce Bayes-optimal (grand averaged)
eye movements, given a smoothly moving target trajectory. This
Bayesian optimality rests upon the particular generative model
used for active inference and its parameters that encode beliefs
about how targets move – and induce eye movements. We  are now
in a position to use this model to generate predictions of subject
behaviour and optimise the model parameters. These parameters
fall into three sets (see Table 1): the parameters of visual kinetics;
the expected log precisions and prior beliefs about the invisible
attracting location trajectory.
Our primary focus in what follows is on the expected log pre-
cisions and how they are affected by experimental context. Note
that we are not determining how the precision parameters ought
to change in response to changes in target characteristics: we are
estimating how they actually change. This is important because
changes in hierarchical precision in a generative model of noisy
target motion may  not just reﬂect but also compensate for changes
in the precision of the target. We  now turn to the nature of this
estimation using dynamic causal modelling.
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Fig. 4. Simulated and empirical tracking. The target pursuit produced by the action simulated in the previous ﬁgure is shown in the upper panels. The upper left panel shows
the  trajectory of the target (broken black line) and the centre of gaze (red line). The difference between these angular displacements (eye position–target position) is the
pursuit position error on the upper right. The presence of the occluder is indicated by the grey blocks. The grand averaged and normalised empirical trajectories and position
errors for all four conditions are shown in the lower left and right panels respectively. Note that the position error reverses sign halfway through the sinusoid; i.e., the eye
is  always ahead of the target during occlusion in the ‘smooth’ condition (red and green lines). ‘AS’ denotes its anticipatory saccadic movement, and ‘lag’ its lag behind the
target.
2.3. Dynamic causal modelling of eye movements
In this section, we brieﬂy review the concept of ‘meta-Bayesian’
modelling, model inversion using dynamic causal modelling (DCM)
and DCM’s application to eye movements. The modelling in this
study can be regarded as ‘meta-Bayesian’ because we are using
Bayes’ rule twice. First, we assume that our subjects are engag-
ing in active Bayesian inference using a generative model of their
sensations p(s|s, ms), with parameters s (including hidden states
and causes) of their (subjective) model ms:
p(s|s, ms) = N(Gs(s), ˙(s)) (16)
Gs denotes the non-linear mapping from the model parameters to
sensory input, which is subject to Gaussian noise. Given the sensory
data they observe (Eq. (16)) we can emulate the Bayesian updates
to their beliefs (Eq. (17)):
p(s|s, ms) = p(s|s, ms)p(s|ms)
p(s|ms) (17)
We can also emulate their Bayes-optimal action a* which max-
imises model evidence:
a∗ = arg max
a
p(s|ms) (18)
This subjective model (Eqs. (16)–(18)) is then absorbed into an objec-
tive model mo of their behaviour (Daunizeau et al., 2010), illustrated
formally in Eqs. (19)–(21):
p(a|o, s, ms, mo) = N(Go(o, a∗(s)), ˙(o)) (19)
p(o, s|a, ms, mo) = p(a|o, s, ms, mo)p(o, s|ms, mo)
p(a|ms, mo) (20)
∗s = arg max
s
p(a|ms, mo) (21)
This enables one to estimate the parameters (e.g. the precision)
of subjective beliefs given the behaviour observed by the experi-
menter.
For timeseries data like eye tracking responses, Bayesian model
inversion usually calls on some form of dynamic causal modelling: a
Bayesian model inversion and selection scheme that uses standard
Bayesian (variational) procedures to estimate the parameters of
time series models – usually speciﬁed in terms of differential equa-
tions. These differential equations specify predicted observations
and form the basis of a likelihood model. The generative model
is completed by specifying prior beliefs about model parameters.
In our case, the predicted position error a = xo(s) − v + e, given
some generative model parameters, provides the likelihood of the
observed position error (averaged over multiple trials), under the
assumption of additive Gaussian noise e∼N(0, ˙(o)):
p(a|o, s, ms, m0) = N(a∗(s), ˙(o)) (22)
a∗(s) = xo(s) − v (23)
Eq. (22) is from Eq. (19); it shows that the likelihood of the position
error depends on both the Bayes optimal position error predicted
by the subjective model and the observation noise. Notice that the
observation model Go = a∗(s) is very simple because the subjects’
behaviour is directly available for observation. Prior beliefs about
the parameters p(s|ms) then provide a full generative model of
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observations, which can be inverted (see Eqs. (19)–(21)). Table 1
contains the prior expectations, while the prior variance of the (log
scaling of the) parameters was set to one half. Note that these (rel-
atively uninformative) priors are our prior beliefs about the model
parameters that encode the subjective beliefs of the (grand aver-
aged) subject.
The inversion scheme used in this application is exactly the same
as the scheme used to invert dynamic causal models of fMRI and
EEG timeseries (see Friston et al. (2007), Friston et al. (2003), Kiebel
et al. (2009) for details). Interestingly, it is based upon the same
gradient descent that underlies the active inference scheme of the
previous section; however here, the posterior expectations of the
parameters (∗o, ∗s ) = ∗ = E[|a, v, ms] optimise the free energy of
observed position errors such that it approximates the log model
evidence:
F(a, ∗) ≈ −ln p(a|v, ms) (24)
This log-evidence can then be used to compare different models
in terms of their likelihood – or to perform Bayesian model aver-
aging. Bayesian model averaging is essentially a way of estimating
the parameters that relaxes assumptions about a particular model
being the correct model. This is achieved by weighting the value of
a particular model’s parameters by the likelihood of that model.
In what follows, we will consider a large number of models that
do or do not allow for changes in various parameters. We  will assess
the evidence for (changes in) a particular model parameter in terms
of the log-evidence of models that do and do not contain (changes
in) that parameter. Finally, we will characterise the effects of exper-
imental manipulations on parameters using the Bayesian model
averages over all possible models.
All of the analysis software used in this paper and a
sample dataset is available as part of the SPM software
(www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm), in the SPEM and DCM toolbox: the
(annotated) demo routine is spm SEM demo.m. A more generic
meta-Bayesian modelling routine (for eye movements but gener-
alisable to other contexts) is called spm meta model.m and can be
found in the DEM toolbox. The integration of the active inference
scheme and subsequent dynamic causal modelling used a local lin-
earisation scheme (Ozaki, 1992) as implemented in spm ADEM.m
and spm nlsi GN.m.
2.4. Experimental paradigm
In this section, we describe the experimental paradigm used
to generate pursuit movements, whose averages are modelled in
terms of active inference. Our intention here was to try to induce
– in normal brains – hierarchical changes in subjective precision
that we have proposed in schizophrenia (as a result of NMDA-
R hypofunction in prefrontal cortex: (Adams et al., 2013b). This
putative manipulation of expected or subjective precision rests on
exploiting (Bayes) optimal neuronal processing of different stimuli.
In brief, normal subjects pursued a sinusoidal target moving
behind a visual occluder under two levels of two experimental fac-
tors. The ﬁrst factor changed the precision of the velocity of the
target – by making the sinusoidal motion noisy. The second factor
was the speed of the sinusoidal motion. Our initial hypothesis was
that decreasing the precision of the velocity would decrease the
precision of hidden states and causes x, v, relative to sensory
precision s. Conversely, we conjectured that the speed manipu-
lation would induce a change in the kinetic parameters but not the
precision parameters. In fact, these hypotheses were rather naive
and we obtained some rather surprising results that, in retrospect,
we could have anticipated.
We acquired pursuit data from 8 healthy human subjects (mean
age 27.1 years, 2 female). All subjects were naïve to ocular pursuit
tasks, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave written
informed consent. The study was  approved by UCL Ethics commit-
tee (1825/003). The experimental protocol was  written in Matlab,
using the Psychophysics and Eyelink Toolbox extensions (Brainard,
1997; Cornelissen et al., 2002) and Cogent 2000, developed by the
Cogent 2000 team at the WTCN and ICN, and Cogent Graphics devel-
oped by John Romaya.
Each subject sat in an enclosed and darkened room, with their
head stabilised using a chin rest and head abutments. The target
was displayed on a 41 cm by 30 cm DELL UltraSharp 2408WFPb LCD
ﬂat screen monitor, 60 cm from the subject. The target consisted of
a black dot (2 mm across) surrounded by a white ring (3.5 mm radial
width) moving over a black background. Total target diameter was
9 mm or 0.86◦ visual angle. Target luminance was  18 cd/m2 and
background luminance was  0.01 cd/m2.
The target moved along a horizontal plane, halfway up the
screen over 75% of the screen width (28.8◦ of visual angle). At the
beginning of each trial, the target stimulus appeared at either the
left or right end of its path, and remained stationary for 1–3 s (the
precise time varied randomly). The target then moved horizontally,
its velocity varying sinusoidally. One trial consisted of three full
cycles of motion. In each trial, the target was occluded between
the midline and the furthest 10% of the path from where the target
started; i.e., for 40% (11.5◦) of the total path, twice per cycle. The
occluder was  the same colour as the background.
Two variables were varied independently in a 2 × 2 factorial
design: the period of the cycle, and the smoothness of the motion.
Two different periods were used, of 4.173 s and 5.1 s, whose maxi-
mum velocities were 21◦/s and 17.2◦/s, and in which the occluded
periods lasted 615 ms  and 752 ms  respectively. We  refer to these
conditions as ‘Fast’ and ‘Slow’, although compared with most pur-
suit experiments these maximum velocities are moderate to fast.
In the ‘Smooth’ motion condition, the target moved sinusoidally. In
the ‘Noisy’ motion condition, a Gaussian random walk of variance
	 = exp(−0.5) was added to the phase of the target motion, such
that:
x(t) = cos(2f (t + 
(t)))

(t) = 
(t − 1) + ω(t)
ω(t)∼N(0, 	2)
(25)
Here f is the target frequency and t the time in milliseconds. This
created rapid ﬂuctuations around an underlying sinusoidal motion,
which had the same period as the Smooth trajectory. The ensuing
ﬂuctuations were too fast to be tracked with the eyes, and subjects
were instructed to follow the ‘average’ position of the target, rather
than the ﬂuctuations themselves. Subjects were explicitly asked to
maintain pursuit and not to saccade to the side of the occluder. Note
that the observer model (Fig. 2, or Eqs. (10)–(15)) does not contain
a model of this stochastic process, because we  wish to see whether
Noisy motion impacts upon the precision parameters in particular.
The experiment consisted of 12 blocks of 4 trials, such that there
were 12 trials (36 cycles) of each of the four conditions. Fast and
Slow stimuli were presented in the ﬁrst and second halves of the
experiment. Smooth and Noisy stimuli were presented in pseudo-
random order, such that every eight trials contained four of each.
Eye movement data – including horizontal and vertical eye
movements and pupil diameter – were collected using an infrared
eyetracker (Eyelink 1000, SR Research, Ontario, Canada), sampling
at 1000 Hz. The eyetracker was  recalibrated using an automated
calibration routine after every block of 4 trials; this entailed the
presentation of a 5 mm white circular target stimulus at ±14◦ hor-
izontal, ±10◦ vertical and 0◦ of visual angle, until the calibration
error was <1◦. The stored .edf ﬁles were converted into ASCII and
imported into Matlab. The pursuit trajectory root mean square
errors were calculated for each cycle, and those over 3.8 cm were
visually inspected. If there was evidence of either a calibration
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problem or gross distortion from blinking (or complete failure to
track the target) the cycle was discarded (<10% total cycles were dis-
carded for any subject). The Slow condition data from three subjects
had to be discarded for technical reasons (archiving problems).
Following the usual procedure in the dynamic causal modelling
of ERPs (e.g., Garrido et al., 2008), we used the grand average pur-
suit trajectories (over cycles and subjects) as (precise) data features
that would inform our Bayesian model comparison – in which we
hoped to ﬁnd evidence for condition-speciﬁc effects on the encod-
ing of precision. Note that this inference goes much further than
simply demonstrating signiﬁcant differences between conditions
(e.g., in relation to intertrial or intersubject variability). The grand
averages were normalised so that they corresponded to a single
cycle of target motion with unit amplitude: this allows us to com-
pare responses from experimental setups with different screen
sizes and distances between the screen and the subject (e.g., in our
subsequent MEG  experiment). The grand averages were then sub-
ject to dynamic causal modelling, allowing all (kinetic, precision
and prior) parameters (except viscosity parameters) to change with
the two (motion noise and speed) experimental factors. Nonneg-
ative precision and prior parameters were estimated in terms of
their log scaling – such that a value of 0 corresponds to a scaling
by exp(0) = 1 or no change from the prior expectations in Table 1.
In addition to estimating these parameters, we also estimated the
changes induced by changing target motion noise or speed.
Notice that in this particular application, we  are estimating the
parameters that explain the average response to multiple noisy
trajectories. This is not the same as the average of the parame-
ters underlying the response to each trajectory. In other words, the
parameters of the average response are not the average parameters
of the responses because the parameters are a nonlinear function of
observed responses. The advantage of using the response average
is that we can use a deterministic generative model that does not
have to consider random or stochastic ﬂuctuations introduced by
noisy target motion (or eye movements).
As noted by one of our reviewers, it is possible in theory to
compare averaged eye trajectories from the start of the experi-
ment with those from the end, to investigate the timescale over
which model parameters are learned. In this paradigm, however,
subjects become familiar with the sinusoidal motion and ampli-
tude, occluder position and motion noise within a few trials, and so
comparing averages of trials 1–8 and 17–24 may not be the opti-
mal  way to assess learning (averaging fewer trials makes parameter
estimation difﬁcult as individual trials are quite noisy – see Fig. 5):
a different paradigm may  be more suitable to characterise learning
per se.
3. Results and discussion
A sample subject’s unnormalised eye trajectories in the Fast and
Slow conditions – before averaging – are shown in the upper and
lower panels of Fig. 5, respectively. The normalised grand averaged
empirical eye trajectories are shown at the bottom left of Fig. 4,
together with the position errors (difference between the eye and
the target) on the bottom right, for the four conditions of our two
factor design; namely, Smooth versus Noisy and Slow versus Fast.
Fig. 6 shows the same observed trajectories and position errors
(top panels) and the predicted trajectories (middle left panel) and
position errors (middle right panel). The predicted responses were
based upon the posterior expectations of the parameters after
Bayesian model averaging. This averaging used post hoc model
optimisation (Friston and Penny, 2011), in which the evidence
(marginal likelihood) for many models with reduced numbers of
parameters is computed from the posterior density over the param-
eters of the full model. Free parameters can then be removed from
the full model using very precise shrinkage priors. The lower panel
of Fig. 6 shows the posterior expectations of the model parameters
(averaged over the four conditions). Condition speciﬁc changes due
to target motion noise and speed are shown in Fig. 7. The parame-
ters are shown in the same order presented in Table 1. For clarity,
the log-precision parameters are shown in teal – separating the
kinetic parameters from the prior parameters. The pink bars corre-
spond to 90% Bayesian conﬁdence intervals. Note that the precision
and prior parameters are log scale parameters.
We  ﬁrst comment on the empirical trajectories. In keeping with
previous work on the oculomotor response to the predictable dis-
appearance and reappearance of a target (Bennett and Barnes,
2003; Orban de Xivry et al., 2009), target occlusion causes an antic-
ipatory saccadic movement followed by a loss of eye velocity, seen
in the averaged position errors (Fig. 4, lower right panel – ‘AS’) as
abrupt advances in eye position ahead of the target shortly after
its occlusion begins and before any lag (on average) develops. The
only exceptions to this pattern are the traces behind the ﬁrst occlu-
sion in the Noisy conditions, whose anticipatory movements do
not (on average) get ahead of the target because they are smaller,
later and occur in the context of greater lag. After the anticipatory
saccade, a low velocity is maintained such that when the target
reappears the eye is now behind it. Thereafter, the lag is corrected
with varying success. The residual pursuit velocities (the averaged
eye velocity during the latter half of target occlusion, once sac-
cades of >35◦/s were excluded from the data – not shown) were
almost identical for both Smooth and Noisy conditions and Fast and
Slow speeds: around −3◦/s when the eye was decelerating during
the ﬁrst occlusion, and around 5◦/s when accelerating during the
second occlusion.
We now turn to the condition-speciﬁc effects. In brief, the effect
of rendering the sensory information imprecise or noisy – the
difference between the Smooth (red and green) and Noisy (blue
and cyan) trajectories – appears to be greater than the difference
between Slow (red and blue) and Fast (green and cyan) pursuits.
The effect of making the stimulus noisier is generally to increase
the lag of the eye behind the target. This is most marked during the
ﬁrst occlusion (in each cycle) and following the second occlusion
– although during the saccade in the second occlusion this effect
momentarily disappears. As noted by one of our reviewers, we were
using an LCD monitor which is susceptible to motion blur (Elze and
Tanner, 2012). In principle, the observed lag in the Noisy condi-
tion may  be due to a target motion blur; however, contribution
of motion blur is probably very small because the biggest lag we
observed was during the ﬁrst occlusion, when no target is visible.
Conversely, the effect of increasing the speed of the target
appears to interact with the presence of Noisy motion. Increasing
the speed of the Smooth target has little effect, other than slightly
increasing the degree to which saccades or subsequent slowing of
pursuit overshoot the target before they are corrected. Increasing
the speed of the Noisy target does not have this effect, but instead
compounds the effect of Noisy motion by increasing the lag of eye
behind target, when the latter is visible.
Comparing the empirical and predicted position errors (Fig. 6,
middle and top right panels) shows a reasonable, if not perfect,
agreement. Most of the deviations from the target trajectory have
been reproduced – and, in particular, the quantitative differences
induced by changing target motion noise or speed. The bottom pan-
els in Fig. 6 display the posterior expectations of the parameters
(averaged over conditions). The point to take from Fig. 6 is that
during pursuit of a predictable target, prior precision remains high
(ln v is unchanged at 4) whereas motion and in particular sensory
precision are diminished (ln s drops to around 1). In neurobiologi-
cal terms, this would mean that in (Bayes) optimal pursuit, subjects
are more conﬁdent about the underlying period of the target in rela-
tion to sensory information than the prior values we used would
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Fig. 5. Unnormalised trajectories from a sample subject. This ﬁgure illustrates all of the eye trajectories from a single subject, prior to their normalisation and averaging. The
upper  panels depict the trajectories from the Fast condition and the lower panels those from the Slow condition. The occluders are shown as grey rectangles. It is clear even
from  this raw data that the eye trajectories in the Noisy condition (blue lines) lag behind those in the Smooth condition (red lines), but the latter track the target (black line)
quite  well. Note that the target line depicts the actual target position in the Smooth condition, but in the Noisy condition a Gaussian random walk was added to the phase of
the  target (not shown). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
suggest. In cognitive terms, this means that subjects are attending
to the high level (global) Gestalt of motion and less to the local dis-
placement and velocity cues. Having noted this, we  now turn to the
important results; namely the condition speciﬁc changes in these
parameters. These are shown in Fig. 7 using the same format as
Fig. 6.
The most important point to note is that the biggest effects of
target motion noise – by far – are on the precision parameters (Fig. 7
left panel, teal bars) relative to effects on kinetic and prior param-
eters (grey bars). Between Smooth and Noisy conditions, sensory
precision ln s and state precision ln x vary by a factor of roughly
exp (2)2 ≈ 60. In comparison, the greatest change in the remaining
parameters is a kinetic parameter 3, changing by a factor of 14 (see
Fig. 7 legend). This is interesting and consistent with our predic-
tions. In other words, the most parsimonious explanation for the
effect of changing target precision was, quantitatively, to change
the precision or conﬁdence evidenced by subjects in beliefs about
the motion of the target and their gaze. Having said this, the pattern
of changes in precision – both over experimental conditions and
levels of the generative model were not exactly what we predicted.
We had expected that introducing uncertainty into target
motion, by making it noisy, would suppress motion and prior pre-
cision (the second and third teal bars), and leave sensory precision
unchanged (the ﬁrst teal bar). However, the quantitative results of
the dynamic causal modelling suggest something slightly differ-
ent: it appears that subjects respond to Noisy target trajectories (at
either Fast or Slow speeds) by attending more closely to sensory
and motion information, while leaving prior precision unchanged.
As we predicted, there was  a shift in the balance of precision away
from upper hierarchical levels (prior precision) and towards lower
hierarchical levels (sensory precision), but this came about due to
an increase in sensory precision rather than a decrease in prior
precision. In retrospect, this is a perfectly optimal response that
does not merely reﬂect but attempts to compensate for the loss of
precision about motion in the stimuli.
Here, we are interpreting the balance between sensory and prior
precision in terms of attention: in predictive coding, attention can
be modelled in a fairly straightforward way through a hierarchical
optimisation of expected precision. This reproduces both sensory
phenomena – like biased competition – and the psychophysics of
the Posner paradigm (see (Feldman and Friston, 2010) for details).
The attentional interpretation of precision also echoes the notion
of ‘gain control’ in movement being a form of ‘motor attention’
(Lisberger, 2010; Brown et al., 2011). In our context, it appears
that subjects respond to noisy stimuli by directing attention to the
stimulus (i.e. increasing sensory precision), rather than suppress-
ing conﬁdence in prior beliefs about its motion. This maintenance
of prior precision is consistent with the observation that increasing
target motion noise had no effect on residual (saccade-free) pursuit
velocity (RPV) during occlusion: had prior precision decreased, we
would have expected a lower RPV during occlusion, as we have
shown in previous modelling work (Adams et al., 2012) – and as
R.A. Adams et al. / Journal of Neuroscience Methods 242 (2015) 1–14 11
Fig. 6. Empirical and predicted tracking. This ﬁgure reports the observed and predicted trajectories (upper left panels) and position errors (upper right panels) for the four
conditions of our two  factor design; namely, Smooth versus Noisy and Slow versus Fast. The predicted (average) responses were based upon the posterior expectations of
the  parameters of the generative model described in Fig. 2. The lower panel of Fig. 5 shows the posterior expectations of the model parameters (averaged over conditions),
plotted  as the changes from prior expectations listed in Table 1, and shown in the same order. For clarity, the precision parameters are shown in teal – separating the kinetic
(eye  movement) parameters from the prior (target movement) parameters. The pink bars correspond to 90% Bayesian conﬁdence intervals.
is found in many studies of schizophrenic SPEM (O’Driscoll and
Callahan, 2008).
As predicted, target speed has no effect on precision parameters:
the conﬁdence intervals around the small increase in prior preci-
sion span zero (Fig. 7). Instead, the only changes were to the kinetic
parameter 4 and prior parameter 8, suggesting that increasing
target speed increased the ‘pull’ of the eye to the attracting location
when behind the occluder (i.e. saccades were faster) and increased
the phase lag between the target and the attracting location, respec-
tively.
The effects of target motion noise on the kinetic parameters
are best expressed in terms of the overall weighting of the eye’s
attraction to the target t or attracting location v (calculated
from the other kinetic parameter estimates: Eqs. (14) and (15)).
v always increases during target occlusion–from around 1/6 to
1/4 in each condition – as we  expected. We had anticipated that
t would always decrease during target occlusion, but in fact this
only occurred during Noisy trials (from around −1/3 to −1/2): the
amount of anticipatory saccadic movements during target occlu-
sion in Smooth trials could only be explained by increases in both
v and t (from around −1/8 to 1/16). Having said this, the kinetic
parameters were not our focus – their raison d’être was to optimise
our estimates of subjective expected precision.
Our next goal will be to show that these precision estimates
correlate with measures of neural activity, and thus establish their
construct validity. In other words, we hope to use the current DCM
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Fig. 7. Context dependent parameter changes. These panels show the changes in parameters due to the effect of increasing the noise of target motion (left) and its speed
(right). The graphs plot the changes in parameters from baseline with (+) and without (−) changes in noise or speed: the changes in kinetic parameters are absolute, but
changes in precision and prior parameters are log scaling factors. Thus moving from Smooth to Noisy conditions increases ˘s by a factor of exp (2.2)
2 – from the left
panel.  The precision parameters are shown in teal and the pink bars correspond to 90% Bayesian conﬁdence intervals. The conﬁdence intervals around ˘v are very broad
because only large changes in ˘v have a substantial effect on eye motion. This means there is a lot of uncertainty about its expected value. For reference, absolute values
of  posterior expectations in a given condition can be determined as follows. The changes in eye kinetics parameters (1, . . .,  6) from priors to posteriors are absolute; e.g.
parameter 3 had a prior expectation of 0.5. Its posterior expectation is changed by −0.21 (from Fig. 5, bottom right panel), and target motion noise exerts a further effect
on  this baseline of ±−0.34 (from Fig. 7, right panel) with no effect of target speed, hence in the Smooth condition 3 = 0.5 − 0.21 − (−0.34) = 0.63 whereas in the Noisy
condition 3 = 0.5 − 0.21 + (−0.34) = −0.05. The changes in precision parameters are log scaled, e.g. for the Smooth condition ˘s = exp(4 − 3.2 − 2.2) = 0.25 whereas in
the  Noisy condition, ˘s = exp(4 − 3.2 + 2.2) = 20. Finally, changes in the prior beliefs about the attracting location were also log scaled, e.g. in the Fast Noisy condition,
8 = (2/32) × exp(−0.4 + 0.15 + 0.13) = (2/32) × 0.88.
paradigm to phenotype behaviour in terms of subjective precision
in a normative setting and then show that this behavioural pheno-
type has neuronal correlates (see below). This involves expressing
free energy in terms of prediction errors and then associating
predictions and prediction errors with various neuronal popula-
tions in the cortical laminae – such that superﬁcial pyramidal
cells pass ascending prediction errors to higher hierarchical lev-
els and receive descending predictions from deep pyramidal cells
(Mumford, 1992). In this setting, precision is thought to be encoded
by the postsynaptic gain of cells reporting prediction error; i.e., the
gain of pyramidal cells sending forward connections in the brain
(Feldman and Friston, 2010). This is important, because many psy-
chopathologies implicate neuromodulation and a putative failure
of postsynaptic gain control. In our previous paper (Adams et al.,
2012), we exploited this link to simulate the failures of active
inference during SPEM that are typical of schizophrenia – whose
pathophysiology is thought to involve abnormalities of dopami-
nergic and NMDA receptor function (Laruelle et al., 2003).
4. Conclusion
In summary, we have described a procedure to estimate (subjec-
tive) Bayesian beliefs that underlie oculomotor pursuit movements
– using an occlusion paradigm and dynamic causal modelling. The
beliefs in question here are formal Bayesian beliefs expressed in
terms of normative models of oculomotor pursuit. Although this
work is primarily a proof of principle – that it is possible to estimate
beliefs from non-invasive eye tracking data – its results speak to the
crucial role of precision or conﬁdence in nuancing the way  that we
sample our world (Warren et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2012; Bogadhi
et al., 2013). Indeed, it was this aspect of perceptual inference that
we were interested in because–in the setting of predictive coding
– the suboptimal encoding of precision or uncertainty may  under-
lie false inference in several neuropsychiatric syndromes (Adams
et al., 2013b).
From a technical point of view, this work introduces the appli-
cation of dynamic causal modelling to eye movement data. In
particular, it suggests that interesting questions can be addressed
to response averages – in exactly the same way that event related
potentials summarise average electrophysiological responses to
well-controlled experimental stimuli. In terms of modelling, we
have also shown that it is possible to use empirical data to inform
(invert) relatively sophisticated Bayesian or normative models of
behaviour. There are many carefully constructed and validated
descriptive SPEM models in the literature (e.g. Barnes, 2008; Deno
et al., 1995; Krauzlis and Lisberger, 1989; Krauzlis, 2004; Lisberger,
2010; Robinson et al., 1986; Shibata et al., 2005): however, the gen-
erative model that we used is distinguished in the sense that it is
a special case of generic (predictive coding) models that conform
to normative (Bayesian) principles. We  have previously shown that
formally similar generative models can reproduce both control and
schizophrenic subjects’ pursuit of targets whose occlusion is either
expected or unexpected, and of targets that unpredictably change
direction (Adams et al., 2012). They can also reproduce the effects
of contrast (sensory precision) on pursuit, such that perceived lag
increases with contrast but true lag decreases, and the anticipatory
initiation of pursuit of a hemi-periodic target (Perrinet et al., 2014).
More generally, there are a whole series of publications using the
this active inference framework to study saccadic eye movements,
perceptual categorisation, omission related responses, handwriting
recognition, the mismatch negativity, sequential choice behaviour
and so on.
The idea of precision-weighted prediction error has important
commonalities with a ubiquitous construct in SPEM modelling: that
of pursuit velocity being driven by gain control of the mismatch
between eye and target velocity (Barnes, 2008; Churchland and
Lisberger, 2002). Indeed, Orban de Xivry et al. (2013) demonstrated
that two Kalman ﬁlters (using precision-weighted prediction
errors) can account for both visually guided and predictive eye
movements respectively. One fundamental difference between our
model and others is that our model uses predictive coding rather
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than optimal control, and therefore does not require efference
copies of motor commands–because predictions of eye and tar-
get dynamics (i.e., corollary discharge) are generated directly by
the forward model (Friston, 2011). In other words, the purpose of
efference copy in optimal control is to create corollary discharge
– i.e. predictions in sensory coordinates – but in predictive coding
these predictions are generated directly, so efference copy itself is
redundant. The cortical oculomotor system can therefore operate
entirely in visual, rather than motor, coordinates (Lee et al., 2013).
Another key difference is the explicit parameterisation of hier-
archical precision: in effect, the (attentional) gain control of
prediction error at every level of the cortical hierarchy, not just at
the level of eye movement generation. Having said this, it would be
entirely possible to compare the evidence of different generative
models based upon data of the sort analysed in this paper using
DCM and response averages. Here, we have focused on comparing
models with and without changes in precision; however, in princi-
ple, one can compare any model (of the same data) using Bayesian
model comparison.
From a neurobiological perspective, the results reported above
provide an important motivation for looking for the neuronal cor-
relates of precision updates in electrophysiological responses. In
particular, the changes in precision induced by changes in target
motion noise should – under predictive coding models of oculo-
motor pursuit – be mediated by changes in the gain of superﬁcial
pyramidal cells in the early visual and oculomotor system. Dynamic
causal modelling of event related potentials has already been used
to quantify these gain changes – in terms of neural mass models and
recurrent self-inhibition – using manipulations of visual precision
in terms of luminance contrast (Brown and Friston, 2012). We  hope
to use a similar approach to assess changes in recurrent (intrin-
sic) connectivity using the occlusion paradigm described above and
magnetoencephalography.
Clearly, it is difﬁcult to model the physiological details of pre-
dictive coding; however, recent efforts to reﬁne neurophysiological
models of canonical microcircuitry and hierarchical (extrinsic) con-
nections have tried to bring the underlying neuronal architectures
closer to those that would support predictive coding (Bastos et al.,
2012). In future work, we will use the results of the current
study to guide searches of neurophysiological models that explain
average electrophysiological responses to visual occlusion during
oculomotor pursuit. This represents a further step in validating
non-invasive measures of neuromodulatory gain control – engaged
during perceptual inference – that can be used in conditions like
schizophrenia.
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